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FOREIGN POLICY IN NATIONAL ELECTIONS

by

Arthur E. Rowse

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RICHARD M. BOECKEL, *Editor*

BUEL W. PATCH, *Associate Editor*

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FOREIGN POLICY IN NATIONAL ELECTIONS

INJECTION of foreign affairs into the 1960 presidential election campaign was made virtually certain when the comparative amity that had come to mark United States relations with the Soviet Union was suddenly shattered in mid-May. Abrupt renewal of the cold war in a form more virulent than ever, a fortnight after downing of the American U-2 spy plane deep within Russia, upset all efforts of the Eisenhower administration to lead the free world toward accommodations with the Communists that might improve prospects of preserving peace. When this country became the target of a stream of threats and insults from behind the Iron Curtain, it was obvious that the Republicans would find it impossible to campaign as the "party of peace"; and that the Democrats in all probability would try to wring advantage from the discomfiture of their political opponents.

Soviet Premier Khrushchev had not stopped at breaking up the summit conference at Paris and threatening countries in which the United States maintains air bases. He proceeded, June 27, to pull the Communist delegations out of the Geneva disarmament conference, though letting the long negotiations on a nuclear test ban go on at least for the time being. Meanwhile, President Eisenhower, whose projected good-will visit to Russia had been canceled by the Kremlin, flew to the Far East only to have a Japanese invitation to visit Tokyo withdrawn at the last moment in the face of massive leftist demonstrations which made it impossible to guarantee his safety. The Reds then took direct aim at this country when Khrushchev early in July proclaimed the demise of the Monroe Doctrine and threatened to rain rockets on the United States if it undertook military intervention in Cuba.

Khrushchev's continued hurling of insults against President Eisenhower and Vice President Nixon stirred resentment among Americans and restored in part the prestige lost

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by the administration through its handling of the U-2 incident.¹ If the Soviet premier should go on to provoke a real international crisis, Democrats without question would unite with Republicans behind the President, for past experience has shown that in cases of grave national emergency, politics will stop at the proverbial water's edge. But if no outright crisis develops, the administration's conduct of foreign affairs is bound to be a leading issue of the campaign.² It could hardly be otherwise in view of recent events. Furthermore, this country's leadership of the free world makes it all but impossible to exclude foreign policy from campaign consideration.

NATURE OF PARTY DIFFERENCES ON FOREIGN POLICY

Because the nation's foreign interests are determined by factors more fundamental than domestic political considerations, party differences in the foreign field are likely to concern more the conduct than the objectives of foreign policy. Democrats are as anxious as Republicans that the United States remain strong, secure, and at peace. Members of both parties, with few exceptions, support American participation in the United Nations, in the free world's regional alliances, and in various activities that have become a duty of good citizenship in today's international community. Questions at issue are mainly the means and methods to be used, or the extent and kind of action needed, to promote policies about which there is a minimum of controversy.

The Eisenhower administration has been criticized, not for trying to establish better relations with the Soviets, but for seeming to blunder along the way—subjecting the nation and the President to a degree of humiliation and ending up with worsened relations. The Democratic platform laid this situation to faults in the administration's machinery for reaching decisions affecting national policy³

¹ Khrushchev heaped personal abuse and ridicule on the President and said further Soviet negotiations with the United States would have to await the next administration. In what appeared to be a deliberate attempt to influence the American election, Khrushchev also attacked Nixon. But when his scorn appeared to be benefiting the Vice President, he took another tack and said Nixon would be the "best choice."

² A Gallup poll of 3,393 county chairmen of both parties, reported June 30, indicated that foreign policy would be the primary issue. Similar results were shown by a Gallup poll of voters and a *Congressional Quarterly* poll of newspaper editors, both reported July 7. Samuel Lubell, public opinion sampler, said on July 11 that "No domestic problem draws anywhere near the responses that foreign problems do."

³ "The mishandling of the U-2 espionage flights—the sorry spectacle of official denial, retraction, and contradiction—and the admitted misjudging of Japanese public opinion are only two recent examples of the breakdown of the administration's machinery for assembling facts, making decisions, and coordinating action."

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and promised to "revamp and simplify this cumbersome machinery," presumably in accordance with recommendations to be made by a study now in progress—which the platform welcomed—by a Senate subcommittee on national policy machinery headed by Sen. Henry M. Jackson (Wash.), the new chairman of the Democratic National Committee.⁴

Administration conduct of foreign relations naturally is accepted as satisfactory by the Republican platform, as is the present state of the nation's defenses, another question that has been in controversy. It is these differences of opinion about conditions, needs, and the way things have been done or should be done that will form the grist of campaign debate on foreign affairs. The close underlying identity of aims is reflected in the platform pledges, as is shown by the accompanying excerpts from statements in the Democratic and Republican foreign policy planks.

DEMOCRATIC PLEDGES ON FOREIGN QUESTIONS

Communists vs. Free World: "We pledge our will, energies, and resources to oppose Communist aggression. . . . We are prepared to negotiate with [the rulers of the Communist world] whenever and wherever there is a realistic possibility of progress without sacrifice of principle. . . . But we will use all the will, power, resources, and energy at our command to resist the further encroachment of communism on freedom—whether at Berlin, Formosa or new points of pressure as yet undisclosed."

Red China: "We reaffirm our pledge of determined opposition to the present admission of Communist China to the United Nations. Although normal diplomatic relations between our governments are impossible under present conditions, we shall welcome any evidence that the Chinese Communist government is genuinely prepared to create a new relationship based on respect for international obligations, including the release of American prisoners."

United Nations and World Court: "Through the machinery of the United Nations, we will work for disarmament, the establishment of an international police force, the strengthening of the World Court, and the establishment of world law. . . . The Democratic party proposes . . . repeal" of the Connally reservation "which, in effect, permits us to prevent a Court decision in any particular case in which we are involved."

Disarmament: "A primary task is to develop responsible proposals that will help break the deadlock on arms control. Such proposals should include means for ending nuclear tests under workable safeguards, cutting back nuclear weapons, reducing conventional forces, preserving outer space for peaceful purposes, preventing surprise

⁴ The Republican platform advocates establishment of a new "top position" whose incumbent would "assist the President in the entire field of national security and international affairs." Creation of such an office was first advocated by Gov. Nelson A. Rockefeller of New York.

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attack, and limiting the risk of accidental war. This requires a national peace agency for disarmament planning and research."

Alliances: "The new Democratic administration will review our system of pacts and alliances. We shall continue to adhere to our treaty obligations. . . . But we shall also seek to shift the emphasis of our cooperation from military aid to economic development, wherever this is possible."

Foreign aid: "We shall place our programs of international cooperation [with underdeveloped countries] on a long-term basis to permit more effective planning. . . . Through the Development Loan Fund and otherwise, we shall seek to assure continuity in our aid programs for periods of at least five years."

Latin America: "In Latin America we shall restore the Good Neighbor policy based on far closer economic cooperation and increased respect and understanding. . . . The new Democratic administration will . . . reaffirm our historic policy of opposition to the establishment anywhere in the Americas of governments dominated by foreign powers."

Arab-Israeli conflict: "We will encourage direct Arab-Israel peace negotiations, the resettlement of Arab refugees in lands where there is room and opportunity for them, an end to boycotts and blockades, and unrestricted use of the Suez Canal by all nations."

REPUBLICAN PLEDGES ON FOREIGN QUESTIONS

Communists vs. Free World: "To nullify the Soviet conspiracy is our greatest task. The United States faces this challenge and resolves to meet it with courage and confidence. . . . The Eisenhower-Nixon administration has demonstrated its willingness to negotiate in earnest with the Soviet Union to arrive at just settlements for the reduction of world tensions. We pledge the new administration to continue in the same course."

Red China: "Recognition of Communist China and its admission to the United Nations have been firmly opposed by the Republican administration. We will continue in this opposition."

United Nations and World Court: "We will continue to support and strengthen the United Nations. . . . Under the United Nations we will work for the peaceful settlement of international disputes and the extension of the rule of law in the world. . . . We suggest that the United Nations take the initiative to develop a body of law applicable to the peaceful use of space."

Disarmament: "We are . . . ready to negotiate and to institute realistic methods and safeguards for disarmament, and for the suspension of nuclear tests. . . . We support the President in any decision he may make to re-evaluate the question of resumption of underground nuclear explosions testing, if the Geneva conference fails to produce a satisfactory agreement."

Alliances: "The countries of the free world have been benefited, reinforced and drawn closer together by . . . our participation in such regional organizations as NATO, SEATO, CENTO, the Organization of American States and other collective security alliances. We assert our intention steadfastly to uphold the action and principles of those bodies. We believe military assistance to our allies under the mutual security program should be continued with all the vigor

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and funds needed to maintain the strength of our alliances at levels essential to our common safety."

Foreign aid: "We mean to continue [well-conceived programs of economic cooperation] . . . We will encourage the countries of Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and Asia to initiate appropriate regional groupings to work out plans for economic and educational development."

Latin America: "We support President Eisenhower's reaffirmation of the Monroe Doctrine in all its vitality. Faithful to our treaty commitments, we shall join the republics of the Americas against any intervention in our hemisphere, and in refusing to tolerate the establishment in this hemisphere of any government dominated by the foreign rule of communism."

Arab-Israeli conflict: "With specific reference to Israel and the Arab nations, we shall encourage in every feasible manner an early resolution of differences between them, an equitable solution of the refugee problem, an end to transit and trade restrictions, the cessation of discrimination against Americans on the basis of religious beliefs."

Foreign Affairs in Past Elections

DOMESTIC ISSUES have been predominant in most presidential election campaigns. Between the War of 1812 and World War I, the United States was generally more concerned with problems of internal growth and frontier expansion than with events beyond its shores. Since 1918, however, the country has become increasingly involved in world affairs—a circumstance that has been reflected to varying degrees in national election contests.

From the beginning of George Washington's second term in 1793 to 1812, the young nation found itself in almost constant political turmoil over what were called foreign entanglements. This was largely because the country then was dependent on trade with European nations and wanted to remain neutral in the numerous armed conflicts among them. The French Revolution, which occurred in the first year of Washington's administration, sharpened a political cleavage just beginning to appear in this country. Alexander Hamilton, Washington's Secretary of the Treasury, became the acknowledged leader of a predominantly pro-English faction, while Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State, headed the relatively pro-French element. Washington kept above the controversy, which was destined to split the Federalist party.

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Against the background of this basic political division arose new frictions with France which profoundly affected the nation's first partisan election in 1796. Two incidents in particular illustrated the sensitivity of Americans to any semblance of interference by foreigners in this country's politics.

INTERFERENCE OF FRENCH ENVOYS IN 1796 ELECTION

The best known of the two incidents was that created by the activities of Citizen Genet. As French minister to the United States, Genet arrived on April 8, 1793, almost simultaneously with the news that France had gone to war with England and Spain. The minister soon wore out a warm popular welcome by embarking on a campaign to get this country into the war on the side of France. He fitted out privateers to prey on British shipping and even sought advance payment of money owed France on a debt incurred during the American Revolution.

The climax came in August 1793 when Genet wrote a dictatorial letter to Washington demanding that he deny a published report that Genet had planned to appeal directly to the American people if the administration rejected his request for payment of the loan. When Jefferson, replying for the President, brushed off Genet's demand, the French minister attacked the Attorney General for refusing to institute libel proceedings against authors of the report. As a result of these provocations, Genet's recall was demanded before the month was over.

The Genet affair was still a topic of debate in the campaign for election of Washington's successor in 1796. Pamphlets accused Jefferson of failing to handle Genet's provocations with more dispatch. "Lift him [Jefferson] to the Presidency," said one pamphlet, "and one of two things must happen. America will be debased by a whimsical, feeble unstable administration or prostrated at the feet of France."⁵

Shortly before the election, a similar incident occurred. Citizen Adet, one of Genet's successors as French minister, had been in the country only a few weeks when he fired off a letter to the Secretary of State accusing the United States of violating treaties with France. As a result, Adet said,

⁵ John B. McMaster, *A History of the People of the United States* (Vol. II, 1898), p. 294.

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he had been directed to suspend performance of his diplomatic duties—"not as a rupture between France and the United States, but as a mark of just discontent."

One historian termed the Adet affair a "bombshell" and said it was "quite probable that it contributed the electoral votes which made Jefferson Vice President."⁶ Of course, other factors were at work, notably the unpopular Jay treaty of 1794 with England. But the Genet and Adet affairs dramatized the political issues of the 1796 election in which John Adams, with 71 electoral votes, barely nosed out Jefferson, with 68 votes, for the Presidency.

During Adams' term, political dissension over the handling of relations with France and England came to a head. A basic disagreement with Adams about relations with France led Hamilton to seek his defeat for re-election in 1800. This conflict so deeply divided the Federalist ranks that Adams stood only in third place when the electoral votes were tallied. Jefferson, candidate of the Republican (Democratic) party, was elected when a tie with Aaron Burr was finally resolved by the House of Representatives. The Federalist party, ripped apart, never regained strong national influence.

ISSUES AND INCIDENTS FROM 1844 TO WORLD WAR II

After the War of 1812, foreign affairs dropped into the background in election campaigns. No question of foreign policy gained political prominence again until 1844, and then from quite a different quarter. The proposed annexation of Texas, which involved the slavery issue and probability of war with Mexico, was a burning issue in that year's contest, starting with the presidential nominations. Martin Van Buren, who had been defeated for a second term in 1840, apparently had the Democratic nomination in hand until he wrote a letter characterizing annexation of Texas as "inexpedient." At that, the Democrats turned to James J. Polk, who swept into office with visions of the United States as a two-ocean power. A treaty of annexation with Texas had been decisively defeated by the Senate in June, but after the election Texas was voted into the Union. According to one authority, this was the only election in American history in which a specific foreign policy "decision was actually arrived at."⁷

⁶ Edward Stanwood, *A History of the Presidency* (Vol. I, 1898), pp. 46-47.

⁷ Dexter Perkins, "Foreign Policy in Presidential Campaigns," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1957, pp. 213-224.

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Nearly a century after the Genet and Adet affairs, another, though less serious, instance of foreign interference in American politics occurred. This time the British minister to the United States, Lord Sackville-West, fell into a political trap set by a correspondent who represented himself as a former British subject, now a naturalized American, in search of counsel on how to vote in the coming election. Although the minister refrained from giving any direct advice, he incautiously implied that a vote for Cleveland, who was standing for re-election, would be more friendly to England than a vote for Harrison, the Republican candidate.

The correspondence promptly found its way into print, Oct. 24, 1888, and was cited by Republicans as proof that Democratic tariff policies favored England's interests over those of the United States. When the British government failed to recall Sackville-West, he was handed his passports. Although Cleveland won a plurality of the popular vote, Harrison outdistanced him in the electoral college. Because the tariff was the chief campaign issue, the incident was considered to have had some influence on the election results.

Imperialism was the major subject of debate in the national canvass of 1900, which came two years after the Spanish-American War had made the United States a world power with new responsibilities in the Caribbean and far across the Pacific Ocean in the Philippine Islands. William Jennings Bryan campaigned vigorously on an anti-imperialist platform, but the country, entering with zest on its untried role as a great power, gave its votes to President William McKinley and his new running-mate, Theodore Roosevelt.

In the first national election after World War I, the question of American membership in the League of Nations was the chief point of difference between Republican Warren G. Harding and Democrat James M. Cox. The Democrats advocated entry into the world organization which Woodrow Wilson, wartime President, had helped to found. But the Republicans, while talking vaguely of supporting some kind of association of nations, wanted nothing to do with Wilson's League. Harding's victory in the 1920 contest reflected the general desire of the American people to "return to normalcy" and leave behind the manifold

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problems in which they had got mixed up by participating in the war in Europe.

The presidential campaign of 1940 was in one respect a repeat performance of that of 1916. Both parties took strong stands against involvement in foreign war. The one foreign policy question that might have caused trouble for the Democrats in 1940 was effectively taken out of the campaign when President Roosevelt gave Wendell Willkie, the Republican nominee, advance notice of the administration's decision to deliver 50 over-age destroyers to Great Britain in exchange for 99-year leases on air and naval base sites in British possessions in the western Atlantic. Willkie raised no objection to the transaction, and it thus was eliminated as a matter of political controversy.

WAR AND POSTWAR ATTEMPTS AT BIPARTISANSHIP

Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, Dec. 7, 1941, ended all question about keeping out of war and united the country in a great drive to vanquish its enemies. With the war still in progress as another national election approached, special efforts were made to exclude foreign policy as far as possible from campaign debate. As early as Sept. 12, 1943, Secretary of State Cordell Hull said that "The supreme importance of these problems should lift them far above the realm of partisan considerations or party politics." Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, a Republican, suggested on Oct. 27, 1943, that both parties incorporate in their 1944 platforms a "substantially identical declaration on international policy." Although Knox's proposal received little support, the platforms of the two parties, while differing on other foreign policy matters, did include similar pledges on participation in a world organization.

Hull, mindful of Wilson's failure to obtain bipartisan support for the League of Nations, had made special efforts to promote acceptance of the project for a new world organization among both majority and minority members of Congress concerned with foreign affairs. His success in that endeavor, followed by the party platform action of the national conventions, convinced him that he had "more than a reasonable assurance that the presidential campaign of 1944, however bitterly it might be fought on domestic issues, would not make the postwar organization a gage of battle."⁸

⁸ *Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (1948), p. 1670.

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It was somewhat later, however, that a firm basis was given to what became known as the bipartisan foreign policy. When Gov. Thomas E. Dewey of New York, the Republican nominee for President, issued a public statement on Aug. 16, 1944, questioning the effect of certain reported proposals on plans for a genuine world organization, Hull proposed a meeting with Dewey to clear up misunderstandings. John Foster Dulles, representing Dewey, then conferred at length with Hull. A joint statement, Aug. 25, announced that Dewey shared Hull's view "that the American people consider the subject of future peace as a non-partisan subject which must be kept entirely out of politics." The Republican candidate subsequently made a few attacks on the administration's conduct of the war, but bipartisanship in foreign policy came through the campaign virtually unscathed.⁹

After Dewey was renominated in 1948, he announced that he would attack the Truman administration for "bungling" and "vacillations" in a variety of foreign fields including China, Greek-Turkish aid, Palestine, and the Berlin blockade which had begun June 24. But he did not follow through. According to one analysis of the Truman-Dewey contest, Dewey, by deciding to conduct a "high-level" campaign, "foreclosed himself on foreign issues" and thereby lost the election.¹⁰

FOREIGN POLICY IN EISENHOWER-STEVENSON RACES

Having seen the non-partisan approach fail in several elections, Republicans chose to take the offensive in 1952. With Gen. Eisenhower, leader of the victorious Allied forces in Europe, as their nominee, they sharply attacked the "Truman-Acheson record." The Republican platform charged that the Truman administration had "lost the peace so dearly won by World War II"; termed Yalta and Potsdam "tragic blunders"; and asserted that "With foresight the Korean War would never have happened." Sen. Richard M. Nixon of California, Eisenhower's running-mate, declared that "the Truman-Acheson policies got us into wars." On Oct. 27, 1952, Nixon called President Truman, Secretary of State Acheson, and Adlai E. Stevenson, the Democratic nominee for President, "traitors to the high

⁹ See "Republicans and Foreign Policy," *E.R.R.*, 1948 Vol. II, pp. 594-595 and p. 604.

¹⁰ Jules Abel, *Out of the Jaws of Victory* (1959), pp. 140-163.

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principles in which many of the nation's Democrats believe."

Stevenson replied: "If there were mistakes, let us discuss them. But let us never confuse honest mistakes, mistakes of judgment, with the insidious designs of traitors. Those who corrupt the public mind are just as evil as those who steal from the public purse."

The climax of the campaign had come on Oct. 24 when Eisenhower made his dramatic pledge to go to Korea to seek "an early and honorable end" to the stalemated war. Democrats called this a "cruel deception" motivated by a desperate effort to win votes, but most observers felt that it clinched victory for the Republicans.

Foreign relations were not expected to play a prominent part in the 1956 campaign. But the prospect changed when Secretary of State Dulles gave an interview to *Life* magazine, which was published with a cover caption of "Three Times at the Brink of War: How Dulles Gambled and Won."¹¹ The article drew anguished cries from Democrats who had supported what they thought were the fundamentals of a bipartisan foreign policy.¹² Dulles was accused of "brinksmanship" and of playing Russian roulette with the nation's security, but the President and other party leaders pointed to the Korean truce as proof that Republicans knew how to establish peace and to maintain peace.

When the campaign got really under way, questions of national defense and foreign policy took on increasing importance. Stevenson, addressing the national convention of the American Legion on Sept. 5, 1956, brought up two sensitive topics: testing of hydrogen bombs and continuation of the draft. On April 21, before his nomination, Stevenson had proposed that the United States unilaterally suspend H-bomb tests and ask other nations to "follow our lead." In the Legion speech he repeated this proposal and suggested also that "We can now anticipate the possibility—hopefully but responsibly—that within the foreseeable future we can maintain the military forces we need without the draft." The candidate added: "I trust that both parties will reject resolutely any thought of playing politics with this issue."

¹¹ James Shepley, "How Dulles Averted War," *Life*, Jan. 16, 1956, pp. 71-80.

¹² See "Foreign Policy in Political Campaigns," *E.R.R.*, 1956 Vol. I, p. 87.

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The next day, Vice President Nixon told the same convention that "to have followed this advice [to end H-bomb tests] would have been not only naive but dangerous to our national security." On the draft, the Vice President said: "This is no time to suggest to our friends or our possible opponents abroad that America is getting soft and tired and is looking for an easy way out of world responsibilities." President Eisenhower called Stevenson's proposals "a design for disaster" and tried to shut off discussion by saying his "last words" on the subject at a news conference on Oct. 11. The bomb-test issue nevertheless continued to be a point of sharp controversy almost to the end of the campaign. It was overshadowed only in the final days, when the events of late October and early November in the Middle East and Hungary captured all attention.

Concern over hostilities at Suez and over Soviet suppression of the rebellion in Hungary inevitably reacted to the political advantage of the Republicans. The advent of crisis made talk of terminating bomb tests and the draft unpalatable. Republican comparisons between "the man of phrases and the man of proved reliability" carried increased conviction. As has been said: "It did no good to point out that the Republicans had based their campaign on being the party of peace, and now had to present themselves as the party capable of dealing with war. The majority in the country knew it; and was willing to trust the President in any case."¹³ The prediction of "sage observers" that "what the President would lose on the peace issue he would recoup as Commander-in-Chief"¹⁴ was borne out on election day, when Stevenson went down to a more decisive defeat than in 1952.

Pre-Campaign Debate on Foreign Issues

SINCE 1952, Republican leaders have pictured their party as the "party of peace" and the Democratic party as the "party of war." Neither the Suez crisis nor the landing of U.S. troops in Lebanon in 1958 seriously embarrassed the Republicans in this respect. Democrats, moreover, re-

¹³ Charles A. H. Thomson and Frances M. Shattuck, *The 1950 Presidential Campaign* (Brookings Institution, 1960), pp. 310-311.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 206.

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frained for the most part from attacking Republican foreign policy goals, partly because of a feeling that the Eisenhower administration was merely carrying on or extending policies laid down during the Truman administration.

Launching of the first Soviet sputnik on Oct. 4, 1957, combined with persisting indications of Soviet missile superiority, caused the Democrats to take a more independent course. They began to accuse the administration of allowing the United States to become a second-best power through slighting scientific research and development and spending too little on national defense. However, on such matters as support of the country's foreign alliances, foreign aid policy, and foreign trade policy there continued to be little disagreement.

EARLY REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC MANEUVERING

Aware of the probable importance of foreign affairs in the 1960 campaign, the men with presidential aspirations began early to try to establish reputations as potential world leaders. Vice President Nixon went on a foreign tour almost every year and in 1959 visited the Soviet Union to open the American exposition in Moscow. Since then, he has referred frequently to his famed verbal tilt with Khrushchev at the exposition—carrying the inference that this demonstrated his ability to “stand up to Khrushchev.” Republican spokesmen have emphasized also the fact that the Vice President, as a member of the National Security Council, has taken part in formulating administration policies on defense and foreign affairs.

Democratic leaders likewise traveled extensively. Stevenson made trips to Africa, Europe, the Middle East and South America. Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey (D Minn.) on Dec. 1, 1958, had an eight-hour interview with Khrushchev at the Kremlin. Sen. John F. Kennedy (D Mass.) was more of a stay-at-home, but he worked diligently to build a record in the foreign field. It has been observed that “Kennedy's post-1956 foreign policy ventures were unmistakably inspired, to a great extent, by dreams of 1960, and designed to pitch him into center stage.”¹⁵ He caused a stir on July 2, 1957, by taking a strong pro-Algerian stand in a Senate speech. In a book published this year, *Strategy of Peace*, the senator expounded his views on various foreign policy questions.

¹⁵ Selig Harrison, “Kennedy as President,” *New Republic*, June 27, 1960, p. 14.

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Until the U-2 spy plane was shot down over Russia, Democratic critics of the administration's record on defense and foreign affairs concentrated on the "missile lag," other alleged security shortcomings, and the charge that the United States had lost its military lead at a time when one miscalculation might touch off a nuclear war. Republicans, meanwhile, insisted that the United States was still the strongest nation militarily because of its overall striking power. And they pointed out that despite some trouble spots the world was at peace.

The U-2 incident and the sharp shift in Soviet foreign policy that began with Khrushchev's breaking up of the summit conference brought a momentary pause in partisan domestic political exchanges. Democratic leaders agreed initially on a show of unity. When Khrushchev implied that he might get more concessions from a Democratic President, Democratic leaders dispatched a cable to Paris, May 17, asking the President to tell the Soviet leader that he would gain nothing by waiting for a summit meeting with another administration. The message was signed by Senate Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson (D Texas); Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn (D Texas); Chairman J. William Fulbright (D Ark.) of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; and Adlai E. Stevenson, titular leader of the party.

PARTISAN OUTBURSTS FOLLOWING SUMMIT FAILURE

The political truce was of brief duration. Vice President Nixon took occasion on May 18 at Buffalo to disclose that a Soviet employee of the United Nations, subsequently expelled from the country, had been spotted in espionage activity in Springfield, Mass., last Sept. 18 at the very hour the Soviet premier was addressing the U.N. General Assembly on disarmament. Nixon's disclosure was an answer to criticism of the timing of the U-2 flight. The Vice President challenged Democrats to open an investigation if they "believe we should have allowed a gap in our intelligence" by barring reconnaissance flights over Russia in advance of the summit conference, or "if they believe the President should have apologized to Mr. Khrushchev."

Nixon's comments angered Democrats in Congress. Sen. Albert Gore (D Tenn.) immediately accused the Vice President of making "an effort to convert the tragedy in Paris to political advantage." His views were echoed the fol-

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lowing day, May 19, by Sen. Mike Mansfield (D Mont.). That night, in a strongly worded speech in Chicago, Stevenson said: "Premier Khrushchev wrecked this conference. Let there be no mistake about that. . . . But we handed Khrushchev the crowbar and sledgehammer to wreck the meeting." Then, as if foreseeing criticism for so bluntly breaking the united front on this matter, Stevenson added: "It is the duty of responsible opposition in a democracy to expose and criticize carelessness and mistakes, especially in a case of such national and world importance as this. . . . We cannot sweep this whole sorry mess under the rug in the name of national unity."

As expected, Stevenson's words brought a storm of criticism, from Democrats as well as Republicans. On the night Stevenson was speaking, Sen. Johnson was calling on all Americans to "unite behind the President." Some Democrats, although agreeing with what Stevenson said, felt that he said it prematurely. Still others, like James A. Farley, called Stevenson "an apostle of appeasement." But on May 22, the Democratic Advisory Council came out with a statement to the effect that the nation's foreign policy was "in shambles" and that "Citizens of our country have not only a right but a duty to speak out on these important matters."

Republicans lashed right back. The party's publication, *Battleline*, said Stevenson had "fallen like a ton of bricks for the Khrushchev line" and added: "[He] has contributed a disastrously divisive speech at a critical hour. He has tried to destroy American unity for personal, partisan, political reasons." Sen. Hugh Scott (R Pa.), referring to an earlier statement by Kennedy that the President might have expressed "regret" to Khrushchev for the U-2 incident, accused both Stevenson and Kennedy of appeasing the Russians.

But the Republicans, like the Democrats, were not united. Gov. Nelson A. Rockefeller entered the scene on May 23 with a call for a national debate on causes of the summit failure. Rockefeller suggested a discussion "transcending the conventional restraints and formulas of partisan behavior." He said: "I hope that Republicans will not try to disguise the present situation. . . . National unity . . . does not mean that a free people should suspend or suppress its own self-examination."

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Republican leaders in Congress agreed the next day to go along with a proposed inquiry into the U-2 incident by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Chairman Fulbright won general praise for keeping displays of partisanship out of the hearings, which ran from May 27 to June 2. The report of the committee, concluding that the administration had mishandled the U-2 affair at every point, was supported by four of the six Republican members of the group.¹⁶

SOVIET PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV AND AMERICAN POLITICS

At a tumultuous news conference in Paris on May 18, Khrushchev had said he did not want to "interfere in the American political scene," but he was convinced that "persons will come to power in the United States who will pronounce themselves in favor of reaching mutually acceptable agreements." This statement was accompanied by contemptuous jibes at Eisenhower, Nixon, and Americans in general.

The Soviet premier seemed to be trying to aggravate political differences in the United States, but with each succeeding tirade his words made less impression. However, on June 23 Stevenson took the precaution to urge Democrats and Republicans alike to "pledge in advance of the campaign to keep Mr. Khrushchev out of the 1960 campaign." This view was endorsed in general by President Eisenhower at a July 6 news conference. The two eventual party nominees, Nixon and Kennedy, did not comment publicly.

Although Arthur Krock had written in the *New York Times* on June 19 that the last-minute cancellation of the President's good-will visit to Japan had "completed the case against what they call the Eisenhower-Nixon administration that the Democrats plan to put before the voters in the presidential campaign of 1960," Democratic leaders all but ignored the event. This was partly because key Democrats had urged the President to make the trip and partly because they wanted to wait for the dust to settle.

The immediate reaction of the President and top Republicans to cancellation of the visit was to assert that the disturbances in Tokyo had been instigated by Communists. No misjudgment on the part of the Japanese or American

¹⁶ Sen. Homer E. Capehart (R Ind.) voted against the report; Sens. Alexander Wiley (R Wis.) and Frank J. Lausche (D Ohio) filed a minority report.

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governments was admitted. In his report to the nation on June 27, the President described his tour of the Far East as on the whole successful. "These disorders," he said, "were not occasioned by America. We in the United States must not fall into the error of blaming ourselves for what the Communists do."

KENNEDY AND NIXON ON QUESTIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY

In a recent exposition of his views on foreign questions, given in a Senate speech on June 14, Sen. Kennedy said the "real issue of American foreign policy today . . . is the lack of long-range preparation, the lack of policy planning, the lack of coherent and purposeful national strategy backed by strength." The task at hand, he said, was "to devise a national strategy—based not on eleventh-hour responses to Soviet-created crises, but a comprehensive set of carefully prepared, long-term policies designed to increase the strength of the non-Communist world."

The senator laid down a 12-point "agenda," setting forth a program of action under each point and detailing reasons for taking the steps proposed. In brief summary, Kennedy said that "We must":

- (1) Make invulnerable a nuclear retaliatory power second to none.
- (2) Regain the ability to intervene effectively and swiftly in any limited war anywhere in the world.
- (3) Rebuild NATO into a viable and consolidated military force, capable of deterring any kind of attack, unified in weaponry and responsibility.
- (4) In collaboration with Western Europe and Japan, greatly increase the flow of capital to the underdeveloped areas of Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America.
- (5) Reconstruct our relations with the Latin American democracies.
- (6) Formulate . . . a new approach to the Middle East.
- (7) Greatly increase our efforts to encourage the newly emerging nations of the vast continent of Africa.
- (8) Plan a long-range solution to the problems of Berlin.
- (9) Prepare and hold in readiness more flexible and realistic tools for use in Eastern Europe.
- (10) Reassess a China policy which has failed dismally to move toward its principal objective of weakening Communist rule in the mainland.
- (11) Begin to develop new, workable programs for peace and the control of arms.
- (12) Work to build the stronger America on which our ultimate ability to defend the free world depends.

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Kennedy's only striking departure from traditional American attitudes was his call for a reassessment of China policy. He adhered to the long-held view that "We should not now recognize Red China or agree to its admission to the United Nations without a change in her belligerent attitude," but he suggested that "perhaps a way could be found to bring the Chinese into the nuclear test ban talks at Geneva."

Vice President Nixon naturally has supported the foreign policies and programs of the administration of which he is a part. At a news conference in Houston, Texas, June 18, he asserted that those policies were "sound and command great support from Republicans, Democrats and independents." Nixon denied that the United States had suffered grave diplomatic defeats in Paris and Tokyo, and he said he did "not fear the foreign policy issue in the campaign."

A statement agreed upon by the Vice President and Gov. Rockefeller, at a protracted surprise conference in New York on the night of July 22-23, disclosed that Nixon was prepared to take a more advanced position in some areas of foreign policy than had been taken by the Eisenhower administration or than the platform committee at Chicago proved willing to adopt. The Nixon-Rockefeller statement went considerably farther than the platform, for example, on the question of regional alliances. The two leaders agreed at New York that:

The vital need of our foreign policy is new political creativity—leading and inspiring the formation, in all great regions of the free world, of confederations, large enough and strong enough to meet modern problems and challenges. We should promptly lead toward the formation of such confederations in the North Atlantic community and in the Western Hemisphere.

The platform substituted the words "regional groupings" for "confederations" and limited the groupings whose formation it promised to encourage to underdeveloped countries of Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. It thus did not envision, as had the Nixon-Rockefeller statement, direct participation of the United States in either a North Atlantic or a Western Hemisphere confederation.

